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Daniel Siemens                       
Writing the History of the SA at the International Military 
Tribunal: Legal Strategies and Long-term Historiographical 
Consequences 
 
After the armistice of 8 May 1945, civilians only slowly 
returned to Berlin, now a city of ruins, hunger and disease. 
From more than four million inhabitants in the early 1920s, 
the number of “Berliners” had decreased to fewer than three 
million, many of them physically and morally wounded. One of 
the early returnees to the capital was the writer Rudolf 
Ditzen, better known under his pseudonym Hans Fallada. His 
novel Kleiner Mann, was nun? (Little Man, What Now?), a 
touching story about a lower middle-class couple suffering 
from the years of depression that was first published in 1932, 
had made him famous shortly before the Nazis came to power. 
Unlike many of the Jewish and left-liberal writers, Fallada 
had been able to publish novels that sold relatively well in 
the first years of the “Third Reich”. He had survived the war 
years in a kind of “inner exile” in Northern Germany, standing 
aloof from the centre of political power. However, in 1945, 
Fallada returned to Berlin and, in a kind of frenzy, wrote 
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down his last novel within a few weeks in the fall of 1946. 
Shortly afterwards, he died, aged 53.1 
This last novel, Jeder stirbt für sich allein (English: Alone 
in Berlin), re-discovered in recent years and nowadays read by 
an international audience, provides a literary panorama of 
German society between 1941 and the end of the Third Reich. 
Engagingly written and full of anger and hate, but also a 
testimony of Fallada’s profound sadness in light of the 
omnipresent destruction and despair, it is a book that 
contains not only a literary truth, but is also a first-rank 
source for a history of mentalities of the immediate post-war 
period. It is yet by and large free of the distortions that 
would soon penetrate most accounts of life under National 
Socialism in the following decades.2 With regard to the 
importance of the SA during the war years, this book is 
                                               
1  See A. Giesecke, “Nachwort”, in: H. Fallada, Jeder stirbt 
für sich allein, Berlin 2013, 687-699, and the contributions 
in C. Gansel / W. Liersch (eds.), Zeit vergessen, Zeit 
erinnern: Hans Fallada und das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 
Göttingen 2008. 
2  This holds true even if one takes into account that Fallada 
had been commissioned by Johannes R. Becher, the president of 
the ”Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands” 
and, since 1954, the first culture secretary of the GDR to 
write such a book. 
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revealing as – in passing – the reader can’t escape the notion 
to what important degree the Party uniforms of SA, SS and HJ 
dominated the streets of the German capital. Stormtroopers 
appear far from being mere decors of the Nazi state; instead, 
they are portrayed as powerful and dangerous arch-Nazis that 
are able to intimidate “ordinary” German workers in a factory 
meeting, have the power to send people into concentration 
camps at their convenience and can even put the political 
police under serious pressure. Later historians have confirmed 
this view, often citing the intensified persecution of Jews 
over the year 1938 that culminated in the infamous pogrom of 9 
November as prime example.3 Mathilde Jamin rightly emphasised 
that, irrespective of the degradation of the SA because of the 
“Night of the Long Knives” on 30 June 1934, uniformed 
stormtroopers remained a well-known signal of danger in the 
                                               
3  From the considerable amount of studies, see recently A. 
Steinweis, Kristallnacht 1938, London 2009; M. Wildt, 
Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung: Gewalt gegen Juden 
in der deutschen Provinz 1919 bis 1939, Hamburg 2007, 301-351; 
K. Wünschmann, Before Auschwitz: Jewish Prisoners in the 
Prewar Concentration Camps, Cambridge, MA 2015, 168-210; Chr. 
Faludi, Die “Juni-Aktion” 1938: Eine Dokumentation zur 
Radikalisierung der Judenverfolgung, Frankfurt a. M., 2013; 
Chr. Kreutzmüller / B. Weigel, Kristallnacht? Bilder der 
Novemberpogrome 1938 in Berlin, Berlin 2013. 
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following years.4 In his novel, Fallada used this “signal 
effect” of the Nazi uniform and coupled it with the back-then 
popular strategy of excuse, summarily referring to “Aryan” and 
“non-Aryan” Germans as the first victims of the Third Reich. 
In his portrait of Berlin in the early 1940s, most Germans and 
German Jews in particular lived in a form of prison, kept 
under guard, bereaved and tortured by Nazi Party officials, SA 
and SS.5 
                                               
4  M. Jamin, “Zur Rolle der SA im nationalsozialistischen 
Herrschaftssystem”, in: G. Hirschfeld / L. Kettenacker (eds.), 
Der Führerstaat: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und 
Politik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart 1981, 329-360, 357. 
5  In this respect, Fallada’s interpretation is typical for the 
tendency of Germans in the post-war period to initially 
concentrate on one’s own suffering, emphasising the character 
of the Nazi State as “terror regime”, the German loss of lives 
during the war and the expulsions of ethnic Germans from 
Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1948. In return, the fate of 
the Sinti and Roma, of the non-German Jewry, of the up to 
eight million forced labourers and of the German murder of 
millions of civilians throughout Europe was largely ignored, 
at least until the 1960s. For a general assessment of this 
aspect of post-war (West) Germany see N. Frei, Adenauer’s 
Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and 
Integration, New York 2002. 
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1. Entangled Narratives of Power and Decline 
In the years after Fallada’s death, many Germans initially 
shared his view that the brownshirts had been a kind of ugly 
face of National Socialism – partly echoing the 1934 
accusations against the former SA leadership under Ernst 
Röhm.6 In the summer of 1934, Hitler had presented the “moral 
failures” of Röhm and his entourage as the tip of the iceberg 
of an allegedly substantially rotten and corrupted mass 
                                               
6  For public reactions to the “Night of the Long Knives” see 
M. Jamin, “Das Ende der ‘Machtergreifung’: Der 30. Juni 1934 
und seine Wahrnehmung in der Bevölkerung”, in: W. Michala 
(ed.), Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, Paderborn 
1984, 207-219; F. Bösch, Das konservative Milieu: 
Vereinskultur und lokale Sammlungspolitik in ost- und 
westdeutschen Regionen (1900-1960), Göttingen 2002, 138; R. 
Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm 
Troopers in Eastern Germany 1925-1934, New Haven, CT 1984, 
143; E. Hancock, Ernst Röhm: Hitler’s SA Chief of Staff, 
Basingstoke 2008, 164-166; P. Longerich, Geschichte der SA, 
Munich 2003, 220; Report from Jacob W. S. Wuest, U.S. Military 
Attaché in Berlin, to the Department of State from 2.7.1934, 
in: Archive „Der Spiegel“ (Hausdokumentation), Personal Papers 
of Heinz Höhne, No. 121; Sopade, Deutschland-Berichte, vol. 1 
(1934), 1980, 191-195. 
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organisation that had threatened the state. He thereby 
elevated his political murder into an act of necessary moral 
cleansing and liberation.7 As the Sopade-Berichte, reports 
from all parts of the Reich collected by the Social democratic 
Party in exile, make clear, such reasoning caught on. The 
reports repeatedly emphasise the SA’s decline and its “lack of 
purpose”, in particular in the years 1935 and 1936, before 
they then start to acknowledge that the discipline and morale 
of the stormtroopers improved again. Throughout the early 
years of the Third Reich, however, most of these reports 
distinguished between the (temporary) decline of the SA as an 
organisation and the persistent power of the individual Nazi 
in uniform.8 
Such ambivalences were quickly forgotten once the Third Reich 
had vanished. By the early 1950s, the SA stood for the 
features that had made National Socialism such an ostracised 
political ideology: above all its brutal violence and a 
complete lack of compassion for those deemed outsiders of the 
                                               
7  See Hitler’s infamous Reichstag speech on 13.7.1934, as 
quoted in M. Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen. 
Vol. 1/1: Triumph, Munich 1965, 409-424. 
8  Sopade, Deutschland-Berichte, vol. 1 (1934), 249-253, 302-
342, vol. 2 (1935), 607-614 ,946-948; vol. 3 (1936), 851-862. 
 7 
Volksgemeinschaft (“people’s community”).9 A particularly 
damnatory assessment came from the former “National Bolshevik” 
Ernst Niekisch, whom the Nazis had imprisoned in 1937. In his 
book Das Reich der niederen Dämonen (Reich of the Menial 
Demons), published in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1953, 
Niekisch described the SA as “a counter-elite” that supposedly 
“attracted all those characters who were rotten and frail from 
within. In the SA, all criminal inclinations were let loose. 
The SA barracks were dens of vice; there were work-shy 
individuals, drunkards, losers (Lebensbankrotteure), 
homosexuals, ruffians and killers who hatched their sinister 
attacks by which Germany should be ‘awoken’”.10 
Contrary to what Niekisch and other Nazi critics intended, 
such public scolding now contributed to the fact that the 
                                               
9  For the intense debate about the nature of the “people’s 
community” and the applicability of this term for historical 
analysis, see the contributions in M. Steber / B. Gotto 
(eds.), Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social 
Engineering & Private Lives, Oxford 2014, as well as J. 
Steuwer’s excellent review article: “Was meint und nützt das 
Sprechen von der ‘Volksgemeinschaft’? Neuere Literatur zur 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus”, in: Archiv 
für Sozialgeschichte 53 (2013), 487-534.  
10  E. Niekisch, Das Reich der niederen Dämonen, Hamburg 1953, 
115. 
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former Janus-faced image of the SA – established in the 1930s, 
as we have seen – quickly lost complexity. In fact, the 
organisational limits of the SA more and more came to serve as 
a most welcome opportunity to belittle one’s former commitment 
to the Nazi cause. Former stormtroopers now claimed that, 
because the original SA from the pre-1934 period had been 
successfully “purified”, the alleged unimportance of this 
organisation in the remaining years of the Third Reich would 
also prove the harmlessness of its former members. They even 
began to publicly claim honourable motives. Such views were 
advanced by Ernst Salomon most influential novel Der 
Fragebogen (The Questionnaire), a bestseller on the West 
German book market that sold 200.000 copies in the first year 
after its publication in 1951 alone.11 Towards the end of his 
novel, Salomon gives a very sympathetic portray of Hanns E. 
Ludin, the long-time leader of the SA in Württemberg who was 
appointed German envoy in Slovakia in 1941. According to 
Salomon, Ludin, who was executed in Bratislava in December 
1947, had been an impeccable German patriot and idealist, 
whereas “in the eyes of the majority of the population” the SA 
had been transformed into the “most harmless” of all Nazi 
                                               
11  For a detailed analysis of the novel’s reception see A. 
Parkinson, An Emotional State: The Politics of Emotion in 
Postwar West German Culture, Ann Arbor, MI 2015, 103-111. 
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organisations after June 1934.12 This distinction between 
individual merit and organisational failure is characteristic 
for Salomon’s entire novel. He belittled and even ridiculed 
the deadly power of the Nazi state and its organisations and 
contrasted this with individual examples of German men and 
women who had allegedly stayed morally clean or had even acted 
heroically. This narrative was a more than welcome invitation 
for many West Germans in the 1950s to paint their own 
biographies in similar colours. 
Early academic scholarship on the stormtroopers did little to 
question such exculpatory assessments. The early expert 
opinions on the SA from historian Hans Buchheim, written 
between 1955 and 1957, deal with topics that back then were of 
use for the German administrations when they had to decide on 
questions of entitlements to maintenance or on retirement 
benefits of former SA members, but they had little to say on 
central historiographical questions about the character of the 
SA and its political clout after 1933.13 A few years later, 
                                               
12  E. Salomon, Der Fragebogen, Reinbek near Hamburg, 192011 
[1951], 637-638. 
13  See H. Buchheim’s expert opinions “SA-Anwärter”, “Die SA-
Wehrmannschaften” and “Die Eingliederung des Stahlhelm in die 
SA”, all in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte (ed.), Gutachten des 
Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Munich 1958, 334-343, 370-377. 
For an analysis of the importance of the Institut für 
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the four expert opinions written for the Frankfurt Auschwitz 
trial in 1964 and intended to provide the judges with a 
trustworthy overview of the political and historical 
developments during the Nazi’s rise to power and in the Third 
Reich were published in 1967 as a book with the telling title 
Anatomie des SS-Staates.14 In this book, the SA is only 
mentioned in passing, and only in as much as its role in the 
terror prior to the Nazi takeover of power and then in the 
establishment of the Third Reich in 1933/1934 was concerned.15 
                                               
Zeitgeschichte for the early historiography on the SA, in 
particular with regard to the books written by the 
academically trained historian and former SA leader Heinrich 
Bennecke, see my forthcoming book on the SA. For the general 
problem of a close collaboration between the Institute’s way 
of writing contemporary history in its early years, at times 
relying on narratives and “factual” information provided by 
former Nazi luminaries, see N. Berg, Der Holocaust und die 
westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung, 
Göttingen 2003. 
14  This title certainly alluded to E. Kogon’s eyeopening book 
Der SS-Staat: Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager, 
Munich 1946. 
15  See above all the expert opinions of Hans Buchheim and 
Martin Broszat in: H. Buchheim et al.(eds.), Anatomie des SS-
Staates, Munich 1999 [1967], 218-225, 336-351. 
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The actual book of reference on the history of the SA in 
German, Peter Longerich’s Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte 
der SA, first published in 1989 and re-edited with a new 
afterword in 2003, still reflects this tendency. Whereas 
Longerich analysed the emergence of the SA and its rapid 
growth during since the late 1920s in detail, he reserved only 
one concluding chapter to the history of the stormtroopers 
between 1934 and 1945, the eleven years of consolidated Nazi 
rule.16 Infrequent interventions, first by the historian Bruce 
Campbell and most recently by Yves Müller and myself, have 
challenged the paradigm of the allegedly “unimportant” SA 
                                               
16  P. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone. Geschichte der SA, 
Munich 1989, 220-245. Similar to Longerich, nearly all studies 
that focus on the SA concentrate on its history prior to the 
“Röhm purge”. From the most recent literature see A. 
Wackerfuss, Stormtrooper Families: Homosexuality and Community 
in the Early Nazi Movement, New York 2015; S. Hördler (ed.), 
SA-Terror als Herrschaftssicherung: „Köpenicker Blutwoche“ und 
öffentliche Gewalt im Nationalsozialismus, Berlin 2013; Y. 
Müller / R. Zilkenat (eds.), Bürgerkriegsarmee: Forschungen 
zur nationalsozialistischen Sturmabteilung (SA), Frankfurt a. 
M. 2013; S. Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und 
Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus und in der deutschen 
SA, Köln 22009. 
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after its “decapitation” in the summer of 1934, but so far 
they did not achieve a general change of perspective.17 
 
2. Shaping History: The International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
and its Accusations 
In what follows, I will take the IMT’s proceedings against the 
SA in Nuremberg as an exemplary test case for analysing the 
correlation between legal practices and historiography. More 
precisely, I am interested in the narrative that was generated 
in the interaction of these two practises. Even if one does 
not agree with Robert Kempner’s early emphatic assessment that 
the IMT was “the greatest history seminar ever held”, 
historical research over the last decades has confirmed that 
the trial “embraced a didactic purpose”, aiming at providing a 
moral lesson that would stand independent of the sentencing of 
                                               
17  B. Campbell, “The SA after the Röhm Purge”, in: Journal of 
Contemporary History 28 (1993) 4, 659-674; Y. Müller, “Wilhelm 
Schepmann – der letzte SA-Stabschef und die Rolle der SA im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg”, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 
63 (2015) 6, 513-532; D. Siemens, “Dem SA-Mann auf der Spur: 
Nationalsozialistische Erinnerungspolitik im Berlin der 
1930er-Jahre”, in: Hördler (ed.), SA-Terror als 
Herrschaftssicherung, 147-163. 
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individual defendants.18 The Nazi organisations that stood 
trial were therefore of particular relevance, as the outcome 
of the IMT potentially impacted heavily on the lives of the 
former members of these organisations comprising of several 
million men in the case of the SA alone.19 As the IMT was the 
first legal authority that established an interpretation that 
distinguished sharply between a pre-1934 SA and the later 
years, it set the path not only for subsequent criminal 
proceedings, but also for the analysis of later historians. In 
this respect, the Nuremberg judges indeed wrote history – with 
lasting effects.  
                                               
18  L. Douglas, “The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and 
Memory into the Courtroom”, in: D. Bankier / D. Michman 
(eds.), Holocaust and Justice: Representation & Historiography 
of the Holocaust in Post-War Trials, Jerusalem, New York 2010, 
11-22, 11-12. 
19  On the legal and political challenges of a criminal trial 
against mass organisations see E. Conze, “‘Verbrecherische 
Organisation’: Genese, Anwendung und Reichweite einer 
Rechtsfigur”, in: J. Hürter / M. Mayer (ed.), Das Auswärtige 
Amt in der NS-Diktatur, Munich 2014, 219-238; G. Rauschenbach, 
Der Nürnberger Prozeß gegen die Organisationen. Grundlagen, 
Probleme, Auswirkungen auf die Mitglieder und ihre 
strafrechtlichen Ergebnisse, Bonn 1954, 15-17, 40-67, 89-90 
(on the verdict against the SA).  
 14 
For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, some background 
information on the IMT and its proceedings are necessary: 
Alongside leading politicians, military commanders and 
business leaders of the Third Reich like Hermann Göring, 
Rudolf Heß, Karl Dönitz and Hjalmar Schacht – to name just 
some of the 24 defendants –, some of the most important 
repressive and terror organisations of the Nazi State like the 
SS, the Gestapo and the SA also stood trial.20 They were to be 
declared “criminal organisations” if they had provided the 
framework in which their members had committed “crimes against 
peace”, were responsible for “war crimes” or had participated 
in “crimes against humanity”. According to article six of the 
charter of the IMT from 8 August 1945, crimes against peace 
were defined as the “planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
                                               
20  The research literature on the post war trials fills a 
bibliography on its own. For recent historiographical 
overviews see K. C. Priemel, “Consigning Justice to History: 
Transitional Trials after the Second World War”, in: The 
Historical Journal 56 (2013) 2, 553-581; idem / A. Stiller, 
“Introduction: Nuremberg’s Narratives. Revising the Legacy of 
the ‘Subsequent Trials’”, in: idem (eds.), Reassessing the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial 
Narratives, and Historiography, New York 2012, 1-21. 
 15 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing”. War crimes, the same 
article stated, included “murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population 
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity”. This was not an exclusive list, but meant 
as an enumeration that set the tone for the proceedings to 
follow. Finally, “crimes against humanity”, a new legal 
category applied for the first time by the IMT and highly 
contested with regard to its technical applicability, 
incorporated murder, the extermination, enslavement or 
deportation as well as other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population, and this – another novelty – 
regardless whether or not these acts were committed in 
violation of the “domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated”.21 
                                               
21  Article 6 of the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 
8.8.1945 (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350, last accessed 
13.7.2015). On the legal aspects of the category “crimes 
against humanity” see also the detailed analysis of D. M. 
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A possible declaration of the SA as a “criminal organisation” 
would have had direct consequences for the judicial 
proceedings against Nazi criminals in the years to come. In 
the case of a positive verdict from the IMT, membership in the 
SA alone would have been a sufficient ground for legal 
punishment in post-war Germany, without the courts having to 
prove the individual guilt of a particular defendant. 
Understandingly, such a verdict would have been a worst-case 
scenario for millions of former SA men. A considerable number 
of them supported the Nuremberg defence team for the SA by 
writing affidavits that at best acknowledged that some 
individual SA men had not always behaved properly, but 
exempted the SA as an organisation from all charges. No less 
than 10.000 people had provided affidavits on behalf of the 
SA, the court informed the public on 30 September 1946, the 
day the verdict was pronounced.22  
                                               
Segesser, “Der Tatbestand Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit”, in: K. C. Priemel / A. Stiller (eds.), NMT: 
Die Nürnberger Militärtribunale zwischen Geschichte, 
Gerechtigkeit und Rechtsschöpfung, Hamburg 2013, 586-604; on 
the origins of the legal concept of “conspiracy”, advanced in 
particular in the United States since 1943, see Conze, 
“Verbrecherische Organisation”, 221-225. 
22  Statement of the President of the IMT, Geoffrey Lawrence, 
on 30.9.1946, in: Secretariat of the Tribunal under the 
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Characteristic for the usually apologetic tone of these 
documents is a detailed memorandum by SA-Obergruppenführer Max 
Jüttner, written while in American custody in Internment Camp 
75 in Kornwestheim near Stuttgart in January 1946.23 Jüttner 
was one of the two surviving SA leaders who had temporarily 
led the SA between 2 May and 8 August 1943 (to be followed by 
Wilhelm Schepmann). According to his own words, he read about 
the Nuremberg trial in the newspapers available at the camp 
and, “as the only SA representative within reach”, immediately 
contacted the IMT in October 1945. As the court did not pay 
much attention to his initial correspondence, he set out to 
write a justification of the SA (and himself), encouraged by 
defence lawyer Robert Servatius, in January 1946.24 Jüttner’s 
                                               
jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany 
(ed.), Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 
1 October 1946 (The Blue Series), Nuremberg 1947/48, vol. 22, 
413. 
23  M. Jüttner, “Führung, Aufgaben und Tätigkeit der SA und 
Nürnberger Prozess”, in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München 
ZS 251/1. 
24  Ibid., 3-4. At the IMT, Dr. Robert Servatius defended the 
Thuringian Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel and the NSDAP leadership 
corps (Priemel / Stiller, NMT, 761-762). He later also served 
as defence lawyer of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
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lengthy vindication of nearly one hundred pages often 
resembles a caricature, in particular with regard to the SA’s 
attitude towards Jews and political enemies: According to 
Jüttner, neither the long-time SA Chief of Staff Viktor Lutze, 
in charge of the SA between 1934 and 1943, nor he himself had 
ever ordered the discrimination or persecution of Jews. Only 
from the Allies had he learned about possible cruelty and 
torture in the concentration camps. Every reasonable man, who 
lets justice prevail, will give the SA credit to its 
honourable motives, Jüttner wrote.25 
 
3. A Conspiracy for War: The Arguments of the Prosecution 
The oral proceedings against the SA began in the afternoon of 
18 December 1945, the 22nd day of the trial. As it was common 
practice, the prosecution as well as the defence relied 
heavily on a large number of documents that were serially 
numbered. In fact, the hearings often resulted in clashes over 
the applicability of certain key documents, next to the 
hearing of witnesses (Jüttner among them). The main prosecutor 
for the SA was the American jurist, Col. Robert G. Storey. In 
Nuremberg, he acted as executive trial counsel on the request 
of the chief prosecutor Robert H. Jackson: “Together with nine 
                                               
25  Jüttner, “Führung”, 11-12, 22. 
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colleagues Storey coordinated the evidence and decided on the 
sequence of the proceeding.”26 
Storey began his accusation by defining the aim and scope of 
the SA, apparently not without difficulties. According to the 
prosecutor, the SA  
 
[…] was an agency adapted to many designs and purposes, 
and its role in the conspiracy changed from time to time – 
always corresponding with the progression of the 
conspiracy through its various phases towards the final 
objective: abrogation of the Versailles Treaty and 
acquisition of the territory of other peoples and nations. 
If we might consider this conspiracy as a pattern, with 
its various parts fitting together like the pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle, we would find that the piece representing 
the SA constituted a link in the pattern vitally necessary 
to the presentation and development of the entire 
picture.27 
                                               
26  D. Gaitner, “Robert Gerhard Storey, A Prosecution Counsel 
at Nuremberg Trials”, in: The New York Times, 18.1.1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/18/obituaries/robert-gerard-
storey-a-prosecution-counsel-at-nuremberg-trials.html [last 
accessed 12.4.2016]. 
27  Statement of Robert G. Storey on 18.12.1945, in: Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, vol. 4, 124. 
 20 
 
“Conspiracy”, as used here, meant the Nazis’ attempt to 
overthrow the democratic state of Weimar and to replace it 
with a Fascist dictatorship that would strive to transform 
itself into a European empire by attacking and occupying other 
countries. As the most distinct feature of the SA, Storey 
identified that all members shared “a fanatical adherence to 
the philosophies and ideologies conceived by the Nazi 
conspirators”.28 This was easy to prove, but it was much 
harder to relate such a vague assessment of the SA’s general 
character to particular crimes punishable by law. 
Storey distinguished four distinct phases or aspects of the 
SA’s history: apart from his first aspect that described the 
SA’s role in disseminating the Nazi ideology (1), the 
remaining three described three chronological phases - the 
period prior to the Nazis seizure of power (2), then its role 
in the first years of Nazi rule (3), and finally a period or 
aspect that designated the SA’s “employment as an agency for 
the building up of an armed force in Germany in violation of 
the Treaty of Versailles and for the preparation of the youth 
of Germany - mentally and physically - for the waging of an 
aggressive war” (4).29 It is this latter phase (or rather 
aspect) that is most interesting here, as the previous periods 
                                               
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid., 130. 
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of the SA’s history are well known and the prosecution by and 
large drew an accurate picture on them that still stands 
today. From the legal perspective of 1945/1946, the fourth 
point was likewise the most important one, as it was above all 
in reference to this period that the prosecution had to prove 
that the SA had indeed provided the framework in which their 
members had committed “crimes against peace” or were 
responsible for “war crimes”, as defined in the legal terms 
mentioned before. 
 Storey claimed that “the SA developed from scattered bands 
of street ruffians to a well-knit, cohesive unit organized on 
a military basis with military training and military functions 
and, above all, with an aggressive, militaristic, and warlike 
spirit and philosophy” in the years between 1934 and 1939.30 
Every year from 1934 onwards, he added, up to 25.000 officers 
and non-commissioned officers were militarily trained in the 
25 SA troop schools and in the three SA Reichsführer 
schools.31 However, Storey also admitted somewhat 
contradictory that the SA “started a rapid decline in its 
importance” after the murder of Röhm.32 Regardless of such 
                                               
30  Ibid., 125. 
31  Statement of Robert G. Storey on 19.12.1945, in: ibid., 
151. 
32  Ibid., 138. 
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inconsistencies, Storey’s accusations regarding the late SA 
appear well grounded. Pointing to the SA’s role in the 
Anschluss of Austria and in the occupation of the Sudetenland, 
Storey claimed that this alone would prove that the SA “had 
been used as a striking force in the first steps of the 
aggressive war”.33 In both cases, he argued, did the SA not 
only provide logistical help, but also provided thousands of 
fighters, both as the “backbone” of the Sudeten German Free 
Corps and also in the “Austrian legion”, an SA brigade 
consisting of Austrian refugees in the Reich and formed as 
early as 1933.34 He also pointed to the last stages of the 
war, from 1944 onwards, when, according to the testimony of 
the SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg,35 the SA took over 
                                               
33  Soviet Chief Prosecutor Roman Rudenko made a similar point 
on 2.3.1946, see ibid., vol. 8, 473. 
34  On the relationship between the SA and the Sudeten German 
Free Corps see S. Dölling, “Grenzüberschreitende 
Gewalttätigkeit – die SA und die ‘Sudetenkrise’”, in: Müller / 
Zilkenat, Bürgerkriegsarmee, 241-263. On the Austrian Legion, 
see H. Schafranek, Söldner für den Anschluss: Die 
Österreichische Legion 1933-1938, Wien 2010. 
35  On Schellenberg see R. R. Doerries, Hitler’s Last Chief of 
Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter 
Schellenberg, London, New York, 2007. 
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several “functions which had previously been entrusted only to 
the SS, the Sipo [Sicherheitspolizei, DS], and Army”: the 
guarding of concentration camps and of prisoner-of-war camps 
as well as the supervision of forced labourers in Germany and 
in occupied areas.36 All this would prove, so Storey 
concluded, that the SA as an organisation as well as their 
individual members “were in fact co-conspirators and 
participants in a conspiracy which contemplated and involved 
Crimes against the Peace and Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes.”37 
 
4. Honourable Men in a Futile Organisation: The Strategies of 
the Defence Team 
The defence naturally challenged such far-reaching 
accusations. The SA’s defence team in Nuremberg consisted of 
three parties: the lawyer Georg Boehm and his team as well as 
the two chosen barristers Dr Martin Löffler and Dr Theodor 
Klefisch.38 The personal papers of the latter, since the late 
                                               
36  Statement of Robert G. Storey on 19.12.1945 in: Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, vol. 4, 158. 
37  Ibid., 159. 
38  H. Seliger, Politische Anwälte? Die Verteidiger der 
Nürnberger Prozesse, Baden-Baden 2016, 191-193. 
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Weimar years a respectable although only regionally known 
criminal defence lawyer from Cologne, have been made available 
for historical research only recently.39 They contain among 
other things documents that deal with Klefisch’s role as a 
lawyer at the IMT and allow for a relatively detailed analysis 
                                               
Martin Löffler (1905-1987) received his Ph.D. in law from 
Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, in 1928. Between 1927 and 
1933, he was a member of the German People’s Party (DVP). He 
later joined the Reiter-SA. During World War II, Löffler 
served in the Wehrmacht before he became a military judge in 
1944. After the Third Reich, he rose to the position of one of 
the leading authorities in the field of press law in the 
Federal Republic. For a short biographical sketch, see his 
entry in the Munzinger archive and the information provided on 
the homepage of the solicitor’s office he had founded after 
the war: http://www.rae-loeffler.de/geschichte.php [last 
accessed 12.4.2016]. At the IMT, Klefisch in the first place 
acted as lawyer for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach. The 
biography of Georg Boehm (1900-1952), a Nuremberg based lawyer 
since 1929, is virtually unknown. 
39  So far we lack a biographical study of Th. Klefisch. On 
his reputation in Weimar Germany see I. Lachmann, “Die Größen 
der Berliner Advocatur”, in: Das Kriminal-Magazin 3 (1931) 29, 
digitised: http://www.anwaltsgeschichte.de/kriminal-
magazin/kriminal-magazin.html [last accessed 13.7.2015]. 
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of the strategy applied by the defence team. As Klefisch never 
spoke in court and only deposited a “speech in writing” on 15 
August 1946,40 we can assume that he mostly did background 
work for his colleagues. Amongst other things, Klefisch is 
said to have provided a detailed memorandum on the SA.41 
Klefisch’s work concentrated on those SA men that had formerly 
been members of the “Stahlhelm. Bund der Frontsoldaten” 
(literally: Steel Helmet, League of Frontline Soldiers), a 
paramilitary veteran’s organisation that had close ties to the 
conservative DNVP until it was gradually dissolved and its 
members for the most parts integrated into the SA between 1933 
and 1935.42 The relationship between these two organisations 
                                               
40  See the statement of Geoffrey Lawrence on 15.8.1946, in: 
Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 21, 175. Klefisch not 
speaking in court was partly the result of tensions among the 
laywers defending the SA, see Seliger, Politische Anwälte?, 
192-193.  
41  Statement by Löffler on 30.8.1946, in: ibid., vol. 22, 
333. The memorandum in question is not included in Klefisch’s 
files. It is possible that the memorandum in question is in 
fact the one written by Jüttner, as quoted above. 
42  V. R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten 
1918-1935, Düsseldorf 1966, 245-274; A. Hoffstadt, “Eine Frage 
der Ehre – zur ‘Beziehungsgeschichte’ von „Stahlhelm. Bund der 
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had been strained before 1933, not least because of class and 
generational differences – in simplified terms: the SA 
appealed to young men, the Stahlhelm to their fathers43 – and 
remained complicated in the years to follow. In the final plea 
of the SA defence lawyers, delivered on 28 August, Georg Boehm 
emphasised this alienation. Referring to the various 
testimonies and affidavits provided, he stressed (alleged) 
strong ideological differences between NSDAP and the Stahlhelm 
and concluded: “A large number of the members of the Stahlhelm 
represented a body within the SA, united by common ideals, who 
regarded the events of the time with the greatest distrust.”44 
The overall strategy of the defence team was to use the 
complexities of the SA’s internal structure and the fact that 
its form had changed considerably at least two times between 
1921 and 1945 to their own advantage, arguing that it would be 
highly unfair and legally unsound to declare such a massive 
                                               
Frontsoldaten‘ und SA“, in: Müller / Zilkenat, 
Bürgerkriegsarmee, 267-296.  
43  For details see Hoffstadt, “Stahlhelm und SA”, 270-277. 
44  Statement of Georg Boehm on 28.8.1946, in: Trial of the 
Major War Criminals, vol. 22, 157. 
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organisation with its up to 4.5 million of former members45 as 
outright “criminal”. Martin Löffler for the defence team 
pointed out that this would be the more incomprehensible as, 
according to the denazification laws applicable in the 
American Zone of Occupation, all SA ranks up to the level of 
Sturmführer were not regarded as in need for automatic 
punishment. In fact, at a time when the SA as an organisation 
was in its entirety accused of having been criminal, some of 
its former members were just recently and legally elected as 
community councillors, Löffler claimed.46 
The strategy of the defence team proved successful. Already on 
28 February 1946, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe from the British 
prosecution team asked to exempt all wearers of the SA Sports 
Badge who were no regular SA members, the SA-controlled home 
guard units and the SA Reserve from prosecution.47 Only the 
main body of the SA should be considered for punishment. 
                                               
45  This number, at least, was the estimate of Dr Kuboschok, 
defence lawyer for the former Reichsregierung, expressed at 
the Nuremberg hearing on 28.2.1946, in: ibid., vol. 8, 392. 
46  Statement of Martin Löffler on 1.3.1946, in: ibid., 415. 
It remained unclear whether this statement was correct, and if 
so, how many former SA men were actually elected. 
47  Statement of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe on 28.2.1946, in: 
ibid., 370. 
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However, defence lawyer Löffler claimed in the following 
session on 1 March 1946 that criminal proceedings against the 
SA still affected everyone “who ever belonged to the SA, even 
for a very short time, during the 24 years between its 
establishment in 1921 and its dissolution in 1945, that is to 
say, during a period of almost a quarter of a century”.48 Not 
surprisingly, Löffler downplayed the SA’s importance during 
the war years as best as he could. In a reply to Storey’s 
accusation, he stated: 
 
Crimes against the laws or customs of war are not charged 
to the SA. It is true that the Prosecution presented an 
affidavit saying that the SA also took part in guarding 
concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps and in 
supervising forced labor; but, according to the 
presentation of the Prosecution, this did not occur until 
1944 within the framework of the total war raging at that 
time, and it has not been charged that this activity of 
the SA involved any excesses or ill-treatment. […] The few 
offenses against humanity charged to the SA by the 
Prosecution and committed by individual members in the 
course of almost a quarter of a century can in no way be 
                                               
48  Statement of Martin Löffler on 1.3.1946, in: ibid., 409. 
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compared with the serious crimes against humanity of which 
we have heard here.49 
 
Löffler went so far as too try to impress the court by 
presenting figures no one could actually verify. At most 2 per 
cent of all SA men had participated in punishable individual 
actions, whereas 98 per cent “kept their hands clean”, Löffler 
stated. He even claimed that this overwhelming majority of all 
former SA men would strongly deny that they had been called 
upon to pursue criminal aims or methods by their leaders.50 
Without being explicitly mentioned, the intense public debate 
about German “collective guilt” provided the background of 
such reasoning.51 
In case his arguments presented so far, based on a mixture of 
logic and audacity did not make a favourable impression on the 
court, the defence team also tried the means of ingratiation. 
To such ends, Löffler presented the following argument: 
 
                                               
49  Ibid., 410. 
50  Ibid., 411. 
51  Cf. the meanwhile „classical“ text by K. Jaspers, Die 
Schuldfrage, Heidelberg 1946. For a detailed analysis of 
Jasper’s text in the context of the early post-war years see 
Parkinson, An Emotional State, 25-65. 
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The sober political instinct that is characteristic of the 
citizens of England and America is non-existent in the 
Germans. We are a politically immature people, credulous, 
and consequently especially susceptible to political 
misguidance. The Court should not overlook this 
dissimilarity when passing its judgment on the good faith 
of the individual members of the organizations. According 
to the impressions which the Defense of the SA has 
received to date from its visits to camps and from 
numerous letters, the majority of SA members are convinced 
that they did not belong to any criminal organization.52 
 
However, as can be seen in the Klefisch papers today, the 
defence team did not simply “receive” such apologetic letters, 
it was also involved in fabricating them. One of the letters 
addressed at Klefisch is particularly revealing with regard to 
the “authenticity” of the arguments presented by the lawyers 
in court: in June 1946, a certain Dr Ludwig Hentschel, an 
engineer from the city of Münster in Westphalia, confirmed to 
having received a letter from the lawyer in the previous 
month. In reaction to this, the engineer told Klefisch that he 
and his “comrades” had immediately begun to “reformulate and 
complement” their initial affidavit from 10 May 1946 according 
                                               
52  Statement of Martin Löffler on 1.3.1946, in: Trial of the 
Major War Criminals, vol. 8, 412. 
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to the lawyer’s demands.53 Such a correspondence makes plain 
that personal observations of former SA men and their 
affidavits – in post World War II Germany commonly referred to 
as “Persilscheine” (“whitewash documents”) – do by no means 
serve as “innocent” autobiographies in a nutshell, but needs 
to be analysed as deliberate and conscious attempts to 
reconcile individual biographies with the new political and 
legal orders. They often served very practical means, be it to 
increase the writer’s change for re-employment or to ward off 
legal prosecution. As testimonies of the zeitgeist, 
oscillating between the general acknowledgement of the 
constraints one had to experience while living in the Third 
Reich and at the same time serving individual exculpation 
strategies, they remain an important historical source. They 
testify to the collective effort in establishing – in the case 
discussed here – a particular view of the SA, with some 
revealing wordings. Just to give one example, a Bavarian 
railway employee wrote tellingly that only very few of the SA 
men had “actively participated in acts of terrorism”.54 He 
                                               
53  Letter from Dr. Ludwig Hentschel to Theodor Klefisch from 
13.6.1946, in: University and City Library of Cologne, 
Archives, Zugang 726 (Verteidigerakten Theodor Klefisch), File 
2, No. 10.  
54  Affidavit of the railroad employee and former SA man 
Reiner Pittinger from 7.6.1946, in: University and City 
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thus involuntarily confirmed that such acts had taken place 
and that he knew of it, even if not all stormtroopers had 
taken part in such actions. 
 
5. The Verdict and its Interpretations 
The Nuremberg judges delivered their verdict on 30 September 
1946. With regard to the SA, its findings divided the history 
of the SA into two distinct periods, up to the summer of 1934 
and afterwards. As for the first period, it was clear that the 
SA has committed crimes, but these crimes were limited to 
German soil and did not match the criteria of the tribunal. 
With regard to the latter period, the verdict is most 
interesting, as it tried to “reconcile” two contradictory 
perspectives, that of the prosecution and that of the defence 
team. “Isolated units of the SA”, so the judges ruled, had 
been “involved in the steps leading up to aggressive war and 
in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity”, 
thus confirming the argument of the prosecution. The court 
here explicitly referred to the occupation of Austria, the 
SA’s contribution to the Sudeten German Free Corps, but also 
to transports of prisoners of war and the guarding of 
prisoners, undertaken by the SA group Sudeten and by SA units 
                                               
Library of Cologne, Archives, Zugang 726 (Verteidigerakten 
Theodor Klefisch), File 3, No. 37. 
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in Danzig, Poznan, Silesia and the Baltic states.55 The judges 
also mentioned the SA’s active participation in the Jewish 
pogrom on the night of the 9 to 10 November 1938, the infamous 
“Crystal Night” or “Night of Broken Glass”, and the “ill-
treatment” of Jews in the ghettos of Vilna and Kaunas.56 
In a noticeable contrast to such allegations, the court 
nevertheless agreed with the defence in as much as they 
adopted the position that “the SA was reduced to the status of 
a group of unimportant Nazi hangers-on” after the 1934 purge. 
This finally brought them to a verdict of not guilty: 
“Although in specific instances some units of the SA were used 
for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
it cannot be said that its members generally participated in 
or even knew of the criminal acts. For these reasons the 
Tribunal does not declare the SA to be a criminal organization 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter”.57 The same 
applies, ruled the court, for the Reich Cabinet and the 
“General Staff and High Command”, whereas SS, SD, the Gestapo 
and certain groups within the NSDAP Leadership Corps were 
                                               
55  The Verdict of the IMT, pronounced 30.9.1946, in: Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, vol. 22, 518. 
56  The Verdict of the IMT, in: ibid., 519. 
57  The Verdict of the IMT, in: Trial of the Major War 
Criminals, vol. 22, 519. 
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found guilty. The journalists present on 30 September 1946 
unanimously commented approvingly. For Hans-Achim von Dewitz, 
writing in the German weekly Die Zeit, the verdict was 
“objective and thorough”. He likewise suggested that it would 
be “politically wise”.58 However, Dewitz’ case urges caution: 
Prior to 1945, he had made a considerable career as a Nazi 
journalist and his new political reasoning was probably more 
due to tactical considerations and practical necessity (the 
reports of accredited German journalists were subjected to 
post-censorship) than the result of a genuine political 
conversion.59 At least with regard to the acquittal of the SA, 
it is nevertheless safe to assume that the silent majority of 
Germans indeed approved the verdict, even if they contested 
the legitimacy of the court in the first place.60 
                                               
58  H.-A. von Dewitz, “Die Tage der Entscheidung. Auf der 
Tribüne in Nürnberg”, Die Zeit, 3.10.1946, 3. 
59  M. Urban, “Kollektivschuld durch die Hintertür? Die 
Wahrnehmung der NMT in der westdeutschen Öffentlichkeit, 1946-
1951”, in: Priemel / Stiller, NMT, 684-718, 684-685. About 
Dewitz’ journalistic work in the Third Reich see P. Köpf, 
Schreiben nach jeder Richtung: Goebbels-Propagandisten in der 
westdeutschen Nachkriegspresse, Berlin 1995, 157-158. 
60  D. Bloxham, “Prosecuting the Past in the Postwar Decade”, 
in: D. Bankier / D. Michman (eds.), Holocaust and Justice: 
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Lawyer Klefisch attributed the fact that the Nuremberg judges 
treated the stormtroopers relatively lenient in large part to 
his own defence strategy that had painted a portrait of the SA 
as a highly complex, but ultimately toothless bureaucratic 
institution in that many Germans had only involuntarily spent 
a short spell of their lives.61 Shortly after the verdict, in 
a letter dated 5 November 1946, he claimed that the specific 
situation of the integration of the former Stahlhelmers had 
more or less saved the whole SA from punishment: “That the 
entire SA was not declared a criminal organisation was to a 
good degree a consequence of the fact that it had incorporated 
a great deal of people from the Stahlhelm within its rank-and-
                                               
Representation & Historiography of the Holocaust in Post-War 
Trials, Jerusalem, New York 2010, 23-43, 37-39. On the 
methodological problems in assessing the German reactions to 
the IMT see H. Krösche, “Abseits der Vergangenheit. Das 
Interesse der deutschen Nachkriegsöffentlichkeit am Nürnberger 
Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher 1945/46”, in: J. 
Osterloh / C. Vollnhals (eds.), NS-Prozesse und deutsche 
Öffentlichkeit: Besatzungszeit, frühe Bundesrepublik und DDR, 
Göttingen 2011, 93-105. 
61  The early research literature on the IMT shared the view 
that the SA’s acquittal was largely the result of a clever 
defence strategy and the picture of the SA it had painted. See 
Rauschenbach, Der Nürnberger Prozeß, 90. 
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file. The conduct of the latter had been proven to be without 
a flaw. It was simply not possible to label an entire 
organization as outright criminal if it contained such a great 
number of irreproachable members.”62  
Several weeks later, on 16 December 1946, Klefisch furthermore 
completed a memorandum of thirty pages length. It has survived 
in the papers of Otto Freiherr von Waldenfels, the Stahlhelm 
leader for Bavaria in the early 1930s, and was originally 
designed as an argumentation aid for his clients in potential 
differences of opinion with Allied authorities. Klefisch here 
summarised and explained the main results of the IMT with 
regard to the SA and the Stahlhelm. In his reading, the 
Stahlhelm was not only a “democratic” organisation, but 
furthermore one that stood in the “starkest contrast to 
Nazism”. This contrast, he exclaimed, resulted in nothing less 
than a “fight between death and life”.63 Those active 
                                               
62  Letter of Theodor Klefisch to an unknown addressee from 
5.11.1946, in: University and City Library of Cologne, 
Archives, Zugang 726 (Verteidigerakten Theodor Klefisch), File 
2. 
63  Th. Klefisch, Denkschrift über den Charakter des 
Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten, und seine Einstellung 
gegenüber dem Nationalsozialismus anhand des dem 
Internationalen Militär-Gerichtshof vorgelegten Materials, in: 
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Stahlhelmers who refused to be integrated in the regular SA 
after 25 January 1934, Klefisch claimed, in most cases 
experienced or were at least threatened with arrest. Deemed 
“politically unreliable”, they remained under the surveillance 
of the Gestapo until the end of the Third Reich, Klefisch 
maintained.64 On the other hand, even those Stahlhelmers who 
did not object to the transfer to the SA ultimately did good: 
because of the high number of irreproachable Stahlhelmers that 
were “retained” in the SA, the influence of the ideological 
hardliners, the “old fighters and fanatics” within the 
stormtroopers decreased, Klefisch asserted.65 
The main motive of the lawyer’s controversial interpretations 
becomes clear at the end of this memorandum: The majority of 
former Stahlhelmers who had been integrated in the SA between 
1933 and 1935 occupied, by the end of the Third Reich, SA 
ranks so important that the laws of the Allied Control Council 
requested particular scrutiny in the upcoming denazification 
processes. This would be the case for all ranks of SA-
Scharführer and higher, Klefisch explained.66 Not 
                                               
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abt. IV, Bestand Stahlhelm, No. 
360, 5, 7 (of the memorandum). 
64  Ibid., 22. 
65  Ibid., 3. 
66  Ibid., 25. 
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surprisingly, the lawyer regarded this classification as 
highly unfair for his clients. His defence strategy on this 
point exploited the different leadership principles of the SA 
and the Stahlhelmers: In contrast to the organisation of the 
Stahlhelm, in which leadership ranks always indicated active 
duties, the formal rank of a particular stormtrooper in the SA 
did not always correspond with actual leaderships tasks 
carried out but this person, he explained. The SA also knew 
honorary leaderships position, a so-called “inactive 
leadership corps”, and many of those former Stahlhelmers who, 
after integration in the SA, did not perform leadership tasks, 
belonged precisely to this second category, Klefisch claimed. 
Therefore, they should be exempt from the authority’s afore-
mentioned particular scrutiny.67 
 
6. Spatial and Temporal Limits to the Persecution of SA Crimes 
However self-congratulating and obviously partisan Klefisch’s 
statements were, it is hard to ignore that they influenced the 
judges at the IMT and that the SA’s acquittal in Nuremberg set 
the tone for the next decades, at least in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. West German courts’ convictions of 
stormtroopers remained limited, with the notable exception of 
their excessive acts of violence in 1933 and 1934 as well as 
                                               
67  Ibid., 26-27. 
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because of the crimes committed at “Crystal Night”.68 The fact 
that these crimes had often been “public” crimes now 
backfired; the deep impact of the SA’s brutality in the wake 
of the establishment of the Third Reich often allowed for 
detailed reconstruction of these acts even fifteen to twenty 
                                               
68  Recently, however, the historian Edith Raim came to a 
somehow different conclusion. Based on an impressive 
collection of case studies of post World War II criminal 
trials against Nazi perpetrators, Raim argues that 
“surprisingly very many criminal investigations were started” 
despite the authorities’ materially and personally 
insufficient conditions. The judiciary contributed positively 
to the “democratisation” of the Federal Republic, a role so 
far acknowledged only insufficiently, she concludes. Against 
such a positive assessment, I would emphasise that despite the 
punishing of individual stormtroopers, the West German 
judiciary by and large remained blind to the systematic 
character of the Nazi rituals of violence. Individual 
wrongdoings were often sentenced as “excess perpetrators” – 
measured, thus, against a highly problematic image of the 
Third Reich as a state of “law and order”. See E. Raim, Justiz 
zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie: Wiederaufbau und Ahndung von 
NS-Verbrechen in Westdeutschland 1945-1949, Munich 2013, 748, 
1173-1177. 
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years later.69 Unsurprisingly, in the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation, Soviet- and later also East German authorities 
demonstrated a particularly vivid interest in the prosecution 
of crimes committed by SA men that had been directed against 
the members of the Communist and Socialist parties. Everywhere 
in East European states now under tight Soviet control, the 
intense suffering of adherents of the political left 
persecuted by Fascist and extreme nationalist regimes was 
exploited as a means to silence the quickly rising protests 
against the new Communist authorities.70 In the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation, the recollection of stormtrooper’s violence 
                                               
69  See above all the aforementioned collection of cases in 
Raim, Justiz zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie, 659-944, as 
well as the database Justiz und NS-Verbrechen / Nazi Crimes on 
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exercised in the early years of Nazi rule – directed 
overwhelmingly against their political opponents from the 
political left and the Jews71 – now served the purpose of 
legitimising the new political order. Remarkably, this 
glorification of Communist’s suffering and death shared an 
important similarity with the Fascist cult of their “martyrs” 
in previous years: In both cases, the ordeal of “party 
martyrs” placed the living under the obligation to follow.72 
Once the GDR was firmly established, however, judicial 
attempts to punish Nazi crimes decreased dramatically since 
the early 1950s, showing a remarkable parallel compared with 
the West German path of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.73 
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by N. Wachsmann / S. Steinbacher (eds.), Die Linke im Visier: 
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While some of the SA’s lower ranks were at least sentenced in 
post-war Germany, usually to moderate penalties, high-ranking 
SA generals, if they stood trial at all, overwhelmingly got 
away with light sentences or were acquitted. Such was the 
case, for example, of Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, SA-
Obergruppenführer in Hesse and police president in Frankfurt 
on the Main from 1933 to 1939 and appointed German envoy to 
Bulgaria in 1941. In this latter role, he had been directly 
involved in the deportation of approximately 11.000 Jews from 
Macedonia and Thrace. A first attempt to hold the former 
police president accountable for his involvement in the 
persecution of German anti-Nazis during the 1930s came to 
nothing, as the Frankfurt prosecution closed the case in 1957. 
Beckerle ultimately stood trial in his hometown beginning in 
November 1967, but proceedings against him were closed in the 
summer of 1968 because of his “ill health”. He died a free man 
in 1976.74 A second example is the afore-mentioned Wilhelm 
                                               
deutsche Beziehungsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg, Paderborn 2002, 
43-49, 63-75; and F. Werkentin’s pioneering Politische 
Strafjustiz in der Ära Ulbricht, Berlin 1995, 168-173. 
74  For details on this trial see idem, 258-286; S. Meinl, 
“Adolf Heinz Beckerle, Frankfurter SA-Führer, Polizeipräsident 
und Diplomat”, http://www.ffmhist.de/ffm33-
45/portal01/mitte.php?transfer=t_ak_beckerle_01 [last accessed 
12.4.2016]. 
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Schepmann, a teacher by profession and later SA-
Obergruppenführer, who acted as the last SA Chief of Staff 
between 1943 and 1945, following Viktor Lutze’s untimely death 
in a car accident. A Dortmund jury court sentenced Schepmann 
on 1 July 1950 to a modest prison term of nine months because 
of his involvement in the violent Nazi takeover of power in 
1933, when Schepmann acted as police president of Dortmund.75 
However, he appealed and was ultimately acquitted in 1954. A 
court in Lüneburg had successfully “denazified” Schepmann 
already two years earlier, in 1952.76 Finally, in 1956, 
Schepmann was elected deputy mayor in the city of Gifhorn in 
Lower Saxony. He died in 1970. 
Schepmann is a typical case insofar as the prosecution was 
interested in him only in his role as former regional SA 
leader and police president of Dortmund. His responsibility 
for the entire SA between 1943 and 1945 did not concern the 
courts. In recent years, however, historians have begun to 
examine the SA of the post-1934 era more closely. Although 
much needs still to be done, new studies demonstrate that a 
                                               
75  See the files in: Landesarchiv NRW, Abt. Westfalen, 
Staatsanwaltschaft Dortmund, No. 1293-1305, 1542-146; Müller, 
“Schepmann”, 531. 
76  Denazification file of Wilhelm Schepmann, in: 
Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover, 
Nds. 171, No. 25522. 
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new assessment of the SA, in particular for the years 1938 to 
1945, is needed. The SA not only actively participated in the 
dismantling of Czechoslovakia, the Anschluss of Austria and 
the reintegration of the Memelland into the Reich – as already 
claimed by the prosecution in Nuremberg. Some SA units also 
fought actively in the Second World War (best-known in this 
respect is the SA division “Feldherrnhalle”). Finally, 
stormtroopers also participated in the notorious 
Partisanenbekämpfung, the combat of alleged partisans, on the 
Balkan Peninsula, albeit operating undercover.77 
 
7. Conclusion 
The initial question of this article was how legal 
argumentation and courtroom practices affected the 
historiography of the Second World War. As I have 
demonstrated, the handling of the SA crimes in Nuremberg – 
where the judges only glanced over important aspects of the 
later SA for legal and practical reasons, as there were more 
important issues and individual defendants at stake – set the 
                                               
77  On these aspects of the SA see S. Döllig, 
“Grenzüberschreitende Gewalttätigkeit”, in: Müller / Zilkenat, 
Bürgerkriegsarmee, 241-263; Müller, “Schepmann”, 520-531; 
Schafranek, Söldner für den Anschluss, 351-392; as well as my 
forthcoming comprehensive history of the SA with Yale 
University Press [publication expected in 2017].  
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tone for the modes in which the history of the stormtroopers 
was assessed in the decades to follow. That the SA was not 
declared a “criminal organization” had indeed not only 
judicial, but also historiographical consequences: First, it 
contributed to the fact that the history of the SA remained 
confined to the Germans lands, the old Reich and Austria, and 
that its transnational activities during the preparation and 
in the course of World War II were neglected or passed over in 
silence altogether. In this respect, one can speak of a re-
regionalisation of a Nazi organisation, as laid out in the 
introduction to this volume. Second, the proceedings in 
Nuremberg and its ultimate assessment of the SA made it easier 
to downplay the structural aspects of stormtrooper violence in 
the years to come, despite the fact that the individual SA 
man’s Aktionsmacht, or “power of action”,78 had by now means 
ended in the summer of 1934. As “little guardians of the 
people’s community”79 they continued to act as a semi-official 
moral police of the Nazi state until the spring of 1945. 
Finally, third, the verdict allowed the vast majority of rank-
and-file stormtroopers to remain unmolested by first Allied 
                                               
78  H. Popitz, Phänomene der Macht, Tübingen, 21992, 43-47. 
79  F. Werner, “Die kleinen Wächter der ‘Volksgemeinschaft’: 
Denunzianten, Boykotteure und Gewaltakteure aus Schaumburg”, 
in: idem (ed.), Schaumburger Nationalsozialisten: Täter, 
Komplizen, Profiteure, Bielefeld 2009, 521-583. 
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and later German judicial investigations unless they were 
accused of having committed personally attributable crimes – 
in contrast to the members of the SS who could be held 
responsible by their membership alone and who were 
comparatively severely punished.80 
In comparative perspective, this feature of the IMT’s verdict 
resembles the outcome of the Tokyo Trial that likewise 
focussed nearly exclusively on the political and criminal 
guilt of key figures in the former Japanese administration and 
in the military, in particular the members of the last Tojo 
cabinet. The situation was somehow different in other Asian 
countries where former Japanese perpetrators of lower ranks 
were prosecuted in several trials, but this did not have 
                                               
80  In an excellent article, Jan Erik Schulte has recently 
demonstrated that, contrary to the prosecution’s intention, 
the post-war Nuremberg trials with their unequal assessment of 
the Nazi terror organisations provided the SS men with 
strategies to present themselves as “scapegoat[s] of various 
societal groups and institutions of National Socialist 
Germany” (J. E. Schulte, “The SS as the ‘Alibi of a Nation’? 
Narrative Continuities from the Nuremberg Trials to the 
1960s”, in: Priemel / Stiller, Reassessing the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals, 134-160, 152). 
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strong repercussions in post-war Japan.81 Here as well as in 
Germany, the multitude of crimes committed abroad by both 
Fascist regimes, in Europe as in Asia, was thus not attributed 
to the many supporters of the regimes but to a few “criminal” 
individuals – a perspective, however, that historical 
scholarship, in particular thanks to the booming field of 
“perpetrator research” since the 1980s, has meanwhile 
overcome.82 
                                               
81  At present, there is considerable research on these so-
called B and C trials and their impact. While it is clear that 
these trials were highly influential in the countries where 
they took place as well as for the former colonial powers in 
the region, their impact on post-war Japanese society remained 
limited. For an overview of this strand of research, see the 
conference report by L. Schouten, Review of Rethinking 
Justice? Decolonization, Cold War, and Asian War Crimes Trials 
after 1945. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. January 2015, 
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=43337 [last 
accessed 12.4.2016], as well as B. Kushner, Men to Devils, 
Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice, 
Cambridge 2015; S. Linton (ed.), Hong Kong’s War Crimes 
Trials, Oxford 2013. 
82  Most recently: F. Bajohr, “Täterforschung: Ertrag, 
Probleme und Perspektiven eines Forschungsansatzes”, in: idem 
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Certainly: that the SA was not pronounced a “criminal 
organization” in Nuremberg did not – in theory – prevent 
individual crimes from being punished in the future. In 
reality, it turned the jurists’ as well as the historians’ 
attention to other institutions, organisations and individuals 
– and maybe rightly so, given the scope of the Nazi crimes 
committed by SS and SD, the Einsatzgruppen and the Waffen-SS 
during the Second World War.83 However, more than half a 
century after the Nuremberg trials, I would suggest that it is 
ultimately time for historians to emancipate from the 
framework set by a team of international jurists and to write 
a new and integrative history of the SA that does not 
necessarily places it “in historian’s hell” (to borrow a 
                                               
/ A. Löw (eds.), Der Holocaust: Ergebnisse und neue Fragen der 
Forschung, Frankfurt a. M. 2015, 167-185. 
83  In this respect, it should be mentioned that the German 
Spruchkammern in the following years usually carefully 
assessed the “personal” guilt even of those defendants who had 
formerly been members of Nazi organisations declared criminal. 
See H. Boberach, “Das Nürnberger Urteil gegen verbrecherische 
Organisationen und die Spruchgerichtsbarkeit der Britischen 
Zone”, in: Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 12 (1990), 
40-50, 45-49; Conze, “Verbrecherische Organisation”, 232-236. 
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formulation by Christopher Browning),84 but that at least 
comes closer to historical reality. The theoretical and 
practical limits of the legal concept of 
Organisationsverbrechen (crimes committed by organisations) 
are not identical equal with the boundaries of 
historiographical analysis. Needless to say, new comprehensive 
histories of the SA, and – for the like – of other Nazi 
organisations, will still benefit from making ample use of 
court proceedings and the impressive amount of legal documents 
available. However, at least with regard to the IMT, 
historians need to pay more attention to the strategies that 
were at play at the time when these documents were produced. 
With regard to the historiography of the SA, the perspective 
advanced here suggests that the lasting importance of this 
mass organisation for the history of the Third Reich has not 
been fully acknowledged so far. It is certain that the post-
war legend of the SA as an “unimportant union of beer 
drinkers”85 cannot stand with its genesis in the courtrooms 
and the Allied internment camps exposed. 
                                               
84  Chr. Browning, Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave-
Labor Camp, New York, London 2011 [2010], 2. 
85  This was the wording in the affidavit of the former SA man 
Reiner Pittinger from 7.6.1946, in: University and City 
Library of Cologne, Archives, Zugang 726 (Verteidigerakten 
Theodor Klefisch), File 3, No. 37. 
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